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Political attention has increasingly focused on limiting warming to 2°C. However, to date 
the only mitigation commitments accompanying this target are the so-called Copenhagen 
pledges, and these pledges appear to be inconsistent with the 2°C objective. Diverging 
opinions on whether this inconsistency can or should be resolved have been expressed. This 
paper clarifies the alternative assumptions underlying these diverging view points and 
explicits their implications. It first gives simple visualizations of the challenge posed by the 
2°C target. It then proposes a “decision tree”, linking different beliefs on climate change, 
the achievability of different policies, and current international policy dynamics to various 
options to move forward on climate change. 
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Political attention has increasingly focused on limiting warming to 2°C. However, to date the 
only mitigation commitments accompanying this target are the so-called Copenhagen pledges, 
and these pledges appear to be inconsistent with the 2°C objective. Diverging opinions on 
whether this inconsistency can or should be resolved have been expressed. This paper clarifies 
the alternative assumptions underlying these diverging view points and explicits their 
implications. It first gives simple visualizations of the challenge posed by the 2°C target. It 
then proposes a “decision tree”, linking different beliefs on climate change, the achievability 
of different policies, and current international policy dynamics to various options to move 
forward on climate change. 
 








According to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 
ultimate goal of international climate policy is to “avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system” (article 2). Defining a dangerous level implies making subjective 
choices and value judgments and any such choice cannot be based on scientific and technical 
evidence only; it has to be a political choice. Following the European Union’s position, 
political attention has increasingly focused on limiting warming to 2°C. This target was 
recognized by the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate in L’Aquila, Italy, in July 
2009; was explicitly included in the Copenhagen Accord; and is present in the final text 
adopted in Cancun in December 2010.  
 
However, to date the only mitigation commitments accompanying this target are the so-called 
Copenhagen pledges, and these pledges appear to be inconsistent with the 2°C objective 
(Rogelj et al., 2010; UNEP, 2010; Meinshausen et al., 2009). Diverging opinions on whether 
this inconsistency can or should be resolved have been expressed. Some believe that the 2°C 
target is still reachable, and that the gap between this target and the sum of countries 
commitments can be bridged with more ambitious policies. Others think that the 2°C target 
has little chance to be reached but that it plays the important role of stating what is desirable, 
and should be kept as a symbolic target. Finally, others believe that the 2°C target is losing its 
credibility, and that the international community should set a new—higher—target.  
The aim of this paper is to clarify the alternative assumptions underlying these diverging view 
points and to explicit their implications.  
The first section gives simple visualizations of the challenge posed by the  2°C target. 
Reckoning that there is some subjectivity in how one defines what is achievable, it aims at 




stylized emissions trajectories and a simple carbon cycle and climate model to show the link 
between the peaking year of global emissions and the stringency of emissions reductions that 
are necessary after the peak to achieve a given target. It further gives several points of 
references to judge these required emissions reductions. These points of reference correspond 
to alternative estimates of what is achievable: (i) historical experience (what has already been 
done in terms of emissions reduction), (ii) committed emissions (what emissions are “locked-
in” if existing infrastructure is operated until the end of its lifetime), (iii) emissions pledges 
(what emissions reductions are already enacted by countries). The reader can chose which 
point of reference corresponds best, in his or her views, to a limit to what emissions 
reductions are achievable in the future; hence deduce how challenging the 2°C target is. 
 
The second section proposes a “decision tree”, linking different beliefs on climate change, the 
achievability of different policies, and current international policy dynamics to various 
options to move forward on climate change. This “decision tree” investigates what to do with 
a 2°C target that becomes increasingly difficult to achieve. It leads to two unsettled issues. 
First, we do not know if the inconsistency between the sum of countries’ emissions reductions 
pledges and the global 2°C target is damaging the UNFCCC process and ultimately the 
success of climate mitigation. Second, there is no consensus on the status of this target: Is it a 
binding commitment from the international community to the world population? Or is it a 
non-binding symbolic goal to help international negotiations move forward? There is no 
scientific evidence or consensus to settle these issues; however the policy options strongly 
depend on the answers. This article cannot conclude on a scientific basis and only aims at 





1.  Visualizing the challenge 
 
1.1. How much time do we have left?  
To visualize the mitigation challenge, we explore the issue of global peaking of CO2 
emissions in light of the 2°C mitigation goal. The aim is to give the reader a sense of the 
stringency of mitigation actions required to reach the 2°C target depending on the peaking 
year, and to compare with historical emission trajectories, “committed” emissions from 
existing infrastructure and mitigation pledges. We use a simple carbon cycle and climate 
model to evaluate the global average temperature increase above pre-industrial levels implied 
by a family of alternative, idealized CO2 emissions trajectories, combined with a fixed 
scenario for non-CO2 gases; see the Annex, and Figure 1. The trajectories are constructed so 
that global CO2 emissions peak n years from 2010. Until then, emissions are assumed either 
(a) to grow at the mean annual rate of emissions growth observed during 2005–10
1 (Scenario 
1); or (b) to be fixed at their 2010 level (Scenario 2), which already represents emissions 
reduction efforts. After emissions peak, the model assumes that ambitious mitigation action 
reduces global CO2 emissions at a mean annual rate of x percent per year until 2100, which is 
taken as the end of the study horizon.  
 
To assess how realistic the 2°C objective is, Figure 2A shows the rate of global CO2 emissions 
decrease (x) after the peak that is necessary to stay below a given temperature increase 
objective (here + 2°C and + 2.5°C) during the 21st century, assuming a climate sensitivity of 
3°C. The figure shows that the required rate of CO2  emission decrease is increasing 
                                                      
1 Note that emissions growth increased over the last decade except in 2009, when global emissions stabilized 
mainly because of the economic slowdown in countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. Considering a continued trend of emissions acceleration before they peak would lead to even 




nonlinearly with the peak year, underscoring the urgent need for action if the 2°C target is to 
be achieved.  
Figure 1. Examples of Emission Trajectories, 2005–2100 





















Scenario 2: constant emissions
until year 2010 +  , then decrease
by  









For comparison purposes, the figure also reports as horizontal lines several points of 
reference. The 1.0 percent per year rate corresponds to the mean annual CO2  emissions 
decrease from 2008 to 2020 necessary to achieve the target of -20% emissions in 2020 
compared to 1990 level, announced by the European Union. This rate becomes 2.1 percent per 
year to reach the -30% target. The US pledge to reduce emissions by -17% in 2020 compared 
to 2005 corresponds to a 1.3 percent per year mean annual emissions decrease rate. With 
world emission peaking after 2020, reaching the 2°C target would thus require – at the global 
level – CO2 emission reduction efforts that are much larger than existing commitments by 
developed countries alone.  
 
Historical experience also provides useful references. For instance, the 4.6 percent per year 
rate of mean annual CO2 emissions reductions from 1980 to 1985 in France corresponds to the 
country’s most rapid phase of nuclear plant deployment. According to WRI-CAIT data, it is 




country over a five-year period, excluding the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States during the years of economic recession that followed the collapse of the former Soviet 
Union. The French example is informative because it represents an important effort to shift 
away from fossil fuel energy and to decarbonize electricity production through the 
introduction of carbon-free technologies (in this case, the nuclear energy) and of energy 
efficiency measures. Even though motivations were different – reducing energy costs vs. 
reducing GHG emissions – and if future climate policies will likely be based on newer 
technologies and different economic instruments, this period provides an illustration of an 
energy transition similar in nature to what is needed to reduce GHG emissions.  
 
From Davis et al. (2010), it can be calculated that committed emissions from existing energy 
infrastructure lead to a mean emission reduction pace of 5.7 percent per year during 2010–50 
(middle scenario) and 4.3 percent (pessimistic scenario) if early capital retirement is avoided. 
In a comparable analysis that also takes the inertia in transport demand into account, Guivarch 
and Hallegatte (2011) find a mean decrease in committed emissions of 3.8 percent per year 
during 2010–50 (middle scenario) and 3.2 percent (pessimistic scenario). To go beyond this 
emission reduction rate, policies affecting new capital would not be sufficient, and early 
capital retirement or retrofitting would be necessary. Doing so would increase the cost of 
climate policy. Moreover, the limits to what is achievable in terms of emission reduction do 
not only depend on technical or economic criteria; political and social acceptability – linked 
in particular to the redistributive effects of climate policies – will also play a major role (Parry 











Figure 2. Rate of Emissions Reduction Necessary to Achieve the 2°C Target or a 2.5°C 
Target as a Function of the Peaking Year for Emissions, with different climate 




(B)   (C)  
Note: Only CO2 emissions, including emissions from land-use, land-use change and forestry, 
are considered; the trajectory of radiative forcing from other gases is forced in this simple 
modelling experiment (see Annex). Historical emissions data are from CITEPA, WRI-CAIT 
and UNFCCC. 
 
These results are obviously affected by the uncertain climate sensitivity parameter. Figure 2A 
is based on the IPCC “best guess” (IPCC, 2007) for climate sensitivity, i.e. 3°C. Figures 2B 
and 2C shows the same result with climate sensitivities of 2°C and 4.5°C. These two 




estimates of the climate sensitivity probability distribution function
2. The figure shows that 
2°C is probably achievable with an emission peak after 2030 if climate sensitivity is around 
2°C. But if climate change sensitivity is 4.5°C, the 2°C target already appears to be 
unreachable, at least if extremely large economic costs are to be avoided.  
 
It appears that there is no definite answer to the initial question of this section “how much 
time do we have left?”, or in other terms “when should global emissions peak?”, since there is 
uncertainty on the climate sensitivity and subjectivity in defining what is technically – but 
also economically, socially and politically - achievable. For example, if one believe the 
climate sensitivity is close to 3°C, and that it is possible (technically possible but also 
economically, socially and politically acceptable) to reproduce at the global scale and over 
several decades the historical experience of emissions decreasing at 4.6%/ year in France over 
1980-85, then we still have 10-15 years before global emissions have to peak to reach the 2°C 
target. If one believes that the emissions reductions given in Copenhagen pledges are close to 
the highest achievable rate of global emissions decrease, then the 2°C target may already be 
out of reach, at least with a constant relative decrease in emissions after the peak. 
 
To investigate more rapid emission decreases, or even negative emissions, the next subsection 
explores another family of emission scenarios, with a linear decrease in emissions (and thus 





                                                      
2 Note that no higher bound has been proposed for climate sensitivity, and published estimates of the climate 
sensitivity probability distribution function have a long right tail. 4.5°C thus cannot be seen as a higher bound for 




1.2. Negative emissions to save the day? 
 
To include net negative global emissions in our “idealized” emissions trajectories, we reiterate 
the same simple exercise with a second set of emissions trajectories (Figure 3). They are 
identical to the first set until the peaking year for emissions, n, i.e. two scenarios are 
considered before peak, either with emissions (a) growing at the mean annual rate of 
emissions growth observed during 2005–10; or (b) fixed at their 2010 level. After emissions 
peak, however, they decrease linearly until 2100, by the amount X per year (expressed as a 
share of 2010 emissions). 
Figure 3. Examples of the second set of Emission Trajectories, 2005–2100 




















2010 + n, then decrease
by X1 GtC per year
Scenario 2: constant emissions
until 2010 + n, then decrease
by X2 GtC per year
 
 
Figure 4 shows the linear annual decrease of emissions necessary to reach a 2°C target or a 
2.5°C target as a function of the peaking year for emissions. The figure also reports as 
horizontal lines the same points of reference as in previous exercise, converted to mean linear 
annual decreases as a share of reference years’ emissions (1980 for the historical French data, 
2010 for committed emissions from Davis et al. and Guivarch and Hallegatte (2011) analyses, 




the peaking year and the linear annual decrease implies negative global emissions before the 
end of the 21
st century. In particular it shows that - with climate sensitivity equal to 3°C - 
negative global emissions are necessary to reach the 2°C target, even if emissions peak today. 
Also, it shows that a global annual decrease of the same order than EU high pledge may 
achieve the 2°C target, if the peak date is between 2017 and 2026, depending on trajectory up 
to peaking year. 
 
Of course, results are dependent on the climate sensitivity. For a 2°C sensitivity, the 2°C 
target appears easier to reach: negative global emissions are required only if emissions peak 
after 2040 and continue to increase from today to peaking year. But if climate sensitivity is 
higher (4.5°C), the room for maneuver is very limited and even a 2.5°C target would require 

















Figure 4. Linear Annual Decrease of Emissions, as a Share of 2010 Emissions, Necessary 
to Achieve the 2°C Target or a 2.5°C Target as a Function of the Peaking Year for 









At this point, it is interesting to assess the quantitative role played by negative global 
emissions in reaching the climate target. Figure 5 gives the year when global emissions 




2100 (left panel). It shows that negative emissions occur relatively late in the century (never 
before 2070), which may appear as good news since it gives some time for research, 
development and diffusion of technologies enabling such negative emissions.  
 
But it also highlights that dramatically high levels of negative emissions may be needed. For 
instance, emissions need to reach -100% of current emission levels, i.e. around -35GtCO2, if 
peaking year is after 2025 and if emissions before peak continue to increase. These levels may 
seem unrealistically high, but they are partly due to the oversimplified form (linear) of 
emissions trajectories considered.  
 
To account for possible limitations of the potential for net negative global emissions, a third 
set of idealized emissions trajectories is considered.  Using the set of scenarios reviewed by 
van Vuuren and Riahi (2011), we assume that the earliest date of net global emissions 
becoming negative is 2060, and that the maximum negative emissions attained in 2100 is -
5GtC. From these assumptions we delimit a linear maximum envelope for negative global 
emissions. Trajectories are then forced to remain within this maximum 2060-2100 envelope, 









Figure 5. (A) Level of emissions in 2100 , 
and (B) Year when global emissions become 
negative as a function of the peaking year 
in linear emissions trajectories achieving 
the 2°C Target or a 2.5°C Target with a 
3°C climate sensitivity. 
 
 
The graphs (Figure 6) are identical to those from previous experiment for the closest dates of 
peaking year for emissions. But when the peak is delayed, the maximum envelope for 
negative emissions becomes bounding, hence emissions reductions between the peaking year 
and 2060 have to be more significant. The linear reduction required to reach the 2°C target 








Figure 6. (A) Linear Annual Decrease of Emissions from peaking year to 2060, as a 
Share of 2010 Emissions, Necessary to Achieve the 2°C Target or a 2.5°C Target as a 
Function of the Peaking Year for Emissions, with a 3°C climate sensitivity, when a 
maximum envelope for global negative emissions is taken into account; and (B) Level of 
emissions in 2100 , and (C) Year when global emissions become negative as a function of 
the peaking year in linear emissions trajectories achieving the 2°C Target or a 2.5°C 









Figure 7. (A) Linear Annual Decrease of Emissions from peaking year to 2060, as a 
Share of 2010 Emissions, Necessary to Achieve the 2°C Target or a 2.5°C Target as a 
Function of the Peaking Year for Emissions, with a 3.5°C climate sensitivity, when a 
maximum envelope for global negative emissions is taken into account; and (B) Level of 
emissions in 2100 , and (C) Year when global emissions become negative as a function of 
the peaking year in linear emissions trajectories achieving the 2°C Target or a 2.5°C 
Target with a 3.5°C climate sensitivity. 
(A) 






If emissions peak occurs after a given date, it may even become impossible to find a trajectory 
of the form defined that respects the climate objective and the maximum envelope. E.g. for a 
3°C climate sensitivity, reaching the 2°C target requires global emissions to peak before 2032 
if emissions are assumed to keep growing before the peak. This result is very sensitive to the 
assumption on climate sensitivity. If only a little more pessimistic, e.g. considering a 3.5°C 
climate sensitivity, global emissions have to peak before 2016 (still with emissions growing 
before the peak), or 2023, (if emissions remain at the 2010 level before the peak); see Fig. 7. 
 
Here again, it is not possible to give an unequivocal answer whether the possibility to produce 
negative net global emissions makes the 2°C target reachable. It depends on the climate 
sensitivity, the stringency of emissions reductions achievable (technically feasible and 
economically, socially and politically acceptable) and the extent of negative emissions 
possible at the end of the century. However, this possibility to produce negative net global 
emissions in 50 years gives some flexibility in the peaking year and/or in the stringency of 
emissions reductions after the peak necessary to reach the 2°C target.  
 
1.3. Concluding on the feasibility of the 2°C target? 
 
The conclusion of these simple exercises is that the 2°C target can only be reached if climate 
sensitivity is not too high, and either under optimistic assumptions about available 
technologies allowing for negative emissions in 50 years or under the combination of two 
conditions, namely: (a) an immediate change in mitigation policies with universal 
participation, leading global emissions to peak extremely rapidly, i.e. in the coming few years, 




reproduce at the global scale and over several decades the highest rate of emissions reductions 
ever observed in a country over a short period.  
 
These results are consistent with published emissions scenarios using high-complexity 
models. Rogelj et al. (2011) show that in the set of scenarios with a ‘likely’ (greater than 
66%) chance of staying below 2°C, emissions peak between 2010 and 2020. Van Vuuren and 
Riahi (2011) show that these scenarios, while indicating the absence of a direct relationship 
between short-term emissions and long-term stabilization targets, suggest that reaching the 
2°C target with 2020 emissions above 2000 levels is possible only if negative global 
emissions are achieved in the second half of the century.  
 
Published modeling experiments exploring low stabilization all reach the first conclusion that 
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations at levels compatible with the 2°C target is 
feasible (e.g. Edenhofer et al., 2010; van Vuuren et al., 2010).
3 However, their second 
conclusion, that it is feasible only under a set of optimistic assumptions, should not be 
ignored. For example, van Vuuren et al. (2010) indicate that the low stabilization levels 
compatible with the 2°C target are close to the maximum achievable emissions reduction 
potential in their model. They show that the target is achievable only if optimistic assumptions 
                                                      
3  It should however be noted that failed experiments tend to not be published, which 
introduces a bias in the low stabilization literature (Tavoni and Tol, 2010). Indeed, when a 
stringent target is revealed as infeasible with a given model, it simply does not appear in the 
literature. Often the policy demand for evaluations of the 2°C target has pushed modelers 
toward implementing more optimistic assumptions for their mitigation portfolios. The 





are adopted on (a) the early participation of major sectors and regions in sufficiently stringent 
mitigation policies from 2013 onward; (b) the expansion of the area needed for food 
production to allow space for bio-energy; (c) a significant increase in the efficiency of 
second-generation biofuels; and (d) the carbon neutrality of bio-energy, that is, that large-
scale development of bio-energy can be done without an increase in land-related CO2 
emissions (from soil degradation, shifting cultivation, deforestation, or draining of peat lands) 
and without an increase of nitrous oxide emissions from the application of fertilizer.  
 
Negative emissions scenarios require large-scale combinations of bio-energy and carbon 
capture and storage (BECCS) (van Vuuren et al., 2010a; Edenhofer et al., 2010; van Vuuren 
et al., 2010b). For instance, Azar et al. (2010) show that two of the three models they consider 
cannot reach stabilization levels below 400 parts per million of CO2 equivalent if BECCS is 
not available. Similarly, Blanford et al. (2009) show that without BECCS or large-scale 
afforestation, the 2°C target is unreachable and the 2.5°C target is extremely difficult to reach. 
However, BECCS is not currently a commercially proven technology and its potential 
remains contentious. Being so dependent on BECCS is a dangerous gamble considering the 
uncertainty with respect to this technology and the feasibility of its large-scale deployment, 
and the risks associated with leakage, food security, water scarcity, and biodiversity 
protection. For instance the low stabilization scenario “Representative Concentration Pathway 
3 Peak&Decline” (RCP3-PD), which relies on large development of BECCS, has the second 
largest primary land area conversion to secondary land (harvested forest), cropland or pasture 
among the four Representative Concentration Pathways (Hurtt et al., 2011). In that scenario, 
low stabilization is achieved at the expense of biodiversity protection.  And without negative 




engineering and radiative-forcing management strategies, with their unknown feasibility, 
risks, and local effects (Schneider, 2008). 
 
Finally, it should be highlighted that most analyses evaluate the feasibility of the 2°C target 
on the basis of technical feasibility only. When accounting for possible political, economic, or 
social constraints, the feasibility appears considerably lower. For instance, the Energy 
Modeling Forum 22 results showed that delayed participation of non-Annex I countries in 
mitigation agreements, as an application of the “differentiated responsibilities” and 
“respective capabilities” principles of the UNFCCC, makes the 450 ppm CO2-eq target 
unreachable (Clarke et al., 2009).  Anderson and Bows (2011) even conclude that the 2°C 
target without an overshoot of the target is no longer compatible with economic prosperity. 
 
2.  From beliefs to actions  
 
This analysis does not allow to conclude from a scientific point-of-view, as there is always 
some subjectivity in how one defines what is achievable. It depends for instance on the efforts 
one is ready to accept to limit climate change. In the same way, the role of the 2C objective 
can be discussed: Is it a binding commitment from the international community to the world 
population? Or is it a non-binding symbolic goal to help international negotiations move 
forward?  As a consequence, alternative views can be expressed as a function of one’s belief. 
To illustrate the role of these beliefs, Figure 8 draws an “opinions tree” to explicit the 
alternative view points and their implications. 
 
The first belief that plays a role is about the ability to reach the 2C objective. If one believes 




years and to reproduce at the global scale and over several decades the highest rate of 
emissions reductions ever observed in a country over a short period of time, it “only” remains 
to design and implement these “ambitious climate policies” at the local and national scales 
and the international architecture to support them. In the same way, if one believes that 
technologies will allow net negative global emissions before the end of the 21
st century to a 
scale that will put the 2°C target within reach, it “only” remains to set the conditions (support 
policies, institutions, public acceptability…) for the development and diffusion of these 
technologies, BECCS in particular. 
 










Climate policies can 
lead global emissions to 
peak in the coming 
years? 
Climate policies can reproduce at 
the global scale and over several 
decades the highest rate of 
emissions reductions ever 
observed in a country over a short 




Keep the 2C objective and build conditions 
(support policies, institutions, public 
opinions, etc.) to enable negative-emission 
technologies development and diffusion 
Scale up adaptation 
plans to account for the 
risks of temperature 
increase higher than 2C. 
Is the inconsistency between global 
target and the sum of individual 
commitments damaging for the 





What options for 
renegotiating a target? 





Keep the 2°C target as a 
symbolic target.  
How to increase the 
ambition of policies? 
Drop the target or 
give it less prominent 
a place.  
How to assess 
progress a t the 
global scale?
Set a higher 
target. 
Recognize need of 
overshoot and 




Yes  Not so 
sure 
Keep the 2C objective, and design and 
implement domestic policies and 
international architecture to reach it 
Technologies will allow 
negative net global 








If one doubts about both assumptions, the 2°C target becomes unreachable, at least without 
allowing for an overshoot of the target, and may be considered as unrealistic. In that case, the 
2°C target does not seem compatible with the sum of individual countries commitments, and 
an internal inconsistency appears in the Copenhagen and Cancun climate agreements. The 
first conclusion concerns adaptation: adaptation plans designed assuming a temperature rise of 
2°C are likely to be insufficient, and adaptation plans, infrastructure design, and land use and 
urban plans need to consider the possibility of greater warming.  
 
Then, there is a question on what to do with a 2°C target that becomes increasingly difficult to 
achieve. Some inconsistency between the target and the commitments is probably 
unavoidable given the nature of the evolution of international negotiations on climate change. 
Indeed, such negotiations have been built on two parallel tracks since the Bali Road Map in 
2007. The first is a Kyoto-like top-down track that starts from a common global objective, 
such as the 2°C objective, and tries to derive consistent commitments for all parties (country 
burden sharing). This approach stems from the public good nature of the climate change issue, 
for which only global emissions matter. It was adopted from the start of international 
negotiations on climate change, but gave rise to unsolvable disputes about the burden sharing 
rules and negotiations deadlocked. This deadlock entailed the creation of a second track of 
negotiations.  
 
This second track is a bottom-up track based on a pledge-and-control approach, and is the 
basis of the Copenhagen Accord. This approach corresponds to the political economy of the 
realities of climate change negotiations: mitigating climate change requires ambitious 
domestic policies with potentially large economic impacts, which cannot be decided in 




to set up through a burden sharing negotiations in short UNFCCC sessions. A bottom-up track 
through which countries announce commitments is thus extremely useful. However, this track 
cannot be sufficient, since these unilateral commitments need at one point to be added up and 
assessed on the basis on their aggregated effect on the world climate, compared to an 
objective in terms of global climate change. 
 
Today, the world is reaching the point when the inconsistency between the global 2°C 
objective and individual countries’ commitments is becoming very obvious. But there is no 
consensus on whether this inconsistency is damaging the UNFCCC process and ultimately the 
success of climate mitigation.  
 
An unreachable target may be damaging by creating unrealistic expectations and an 
impression of failure, obscuring real successes in limiting emissions, creating a demobilizing 
climate of pessimism. Clemens et al. (2007) warn about this risk for Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). They argue that the growing concern that the MDGs will not be achieved by 
2015 is obscuring the bigger picture that development progress has been occurring at 
unprecedented levels over the past years. Indeed, among the many countries that are likely to 
miss the MDGs in 2015, many will yet still outperform the historical trajectories of now-
developed countries. They conclude that, by labelling many development successes as 
failures, the MDGs may create an inaccurate climate of pessimism toward aid, which may 
undermine future constituencies for aid (in donors) and reform (in recipients).  
 
Also, the inconsistency between global target and country commitments may give low 
emitting and highly vulnerable countries, such as Small Island Developing States or African 




trust in the process. More generally, trusting interstate relationships can emerge only when 
states can ‘commit’ themselves to particular outcomes (e.g., Kydd, 2000; Wendt, 1999), 
through commitments that are sufficiently costly to violate (Kydd, 2000; Fearon, 1994; 
Schelling, 1966). And the ability to make binding commitments is essential to the process of 
international institutionalization (Keohane, 1984). Making unrealistic commitments suggests 
that violating them is not costly, and weaken all other commitments, and trust in general.  
 
The consequences of a loss of trust in international negotiation can be illustrated by the case 
of international development aid. Since 1970, developed countries have repeated their 
commitment to increase aid up to 0.7 percent of their gross national product. Yet in most 
countries, it has amounted to only 0.4 percent. This target likely played a positive role to 
obtain public support for foreign aid budget in developed countries. But because of the 
continued gap between the target and the reality, it also had a negative impact on international 
discussions, as developing countries now understandably receive all commitments related to 
development aid by the industrial countries with disappointment, and sometimes skepticism. 
 
Similarly, within countries, citizens and businesses are unlikely to support an international 
process that appears inconsistent and based on unrealistic commitments.  National climate 
policies thus risk to appear less credible (or acceptable), and citizens and private actors would 
be less inclined to invest in low-carbon options, which would reinforce the risk of lock-in a 
carbon-intensive economic model. 
 
But this opinion is not consensual. Alternative points of view consider the 2°C target as a 
“symbolic target”, i.e. a target that is more a mean than an end. In that framework, the 2°C 




and measure progress. Along this view of the 2°C target as primarily a mean to drive 
mitigation efforts worldwide, its inclusion in official texts, in particular the final UNFCCC 
text adopted in Cancun in December 2010, may be acknowledge as a real success, and 
renegotiating it would be damaging to the process. The Millennium Development Goals 
provide an example of such symbolic targets that are not supposed to be binding constraints, 
but as a commonly-agreed objective guiding the action of many governments, donors, and 
international organizations. The MDG offered a framework that undoubtedly helped reverse 
aid decline after end of Cold War, and stimulate the aid community (Hulme, 2007; Hulme and 
Scott, 2010). With such a target, the increasing difficulty in reaching the target might not be a 
problem, except if a “literal” interpretation of the target creates a demobilizing impression of 
failure (as suggested by Clemens et al.,2007).  
 
Depending on what one thinks about this debate, i.e. about the damage from the inconsistency 
between the global target and individual country commitments, the best approach is different.  
 
If one thinks that the damage is limited, then it is possible to keep the 2°C target as a symbolic 
target, and focus on improving country commitment to close the gap. If one thinks that the 
damage is large, then the international community should prevent a widening of the gap 
between the official global target and the sum of countries’ commitments. There are several 
ways to do so. 
 
First, one can think that such a global target is not necessary. In that case, it might be possible 





Otherwise, assuming that a realistic long-term global target is useful or even necessary, the 
international community would have to set a new, more realistic objective. Changing the 
international target can be done through an increase in the objective (e.g., to 2.5°C), through 
the recognition that an overshoot will be needed and the provision of a limit to this overshoot 
(e.g., the objective of a 2°C stabilization with overshoot below 2.5°C), or through a focus on 
medium-term objectives (e.g. the objective of limiting warming below 1.8°C in 2050).  
 
Such a change in target would likely be perceived as a failure, especially by those who have 
championed the 2°C target for years, but it would issue a useful wake-up call, and would also 
be a way to communicate an important aspect of the climate change problem: delaying action 
does not mean we can still achieve the same results. If we delay the construction of a high 
speed train line by five years, we get the same train line, or an even better one, five years 
later. By contrast, with climate change mitigation, reachable objectives will become 




Conclusion: 2C or not 2C? 
 
This paper does not pretend to answer on what should be done with the 2°C target. Indeed, 
this depends on what is considered achievable from a political and economical perspective, 
which is and will remain a subjective question (theoretically, one can stop emitting overnight 
by turning off all emitting devices). It also depends on the status of the 2°C target, and there is 




information to make it possible for the reader to make his or her own opinion. And this is why 
we let our readers draw their own conclusion from this information… 
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This Annex describes the hypotheses and modeling assumptions used to produce Figures 2, 
and 4 to 7. 
 
Radiative Forcing from Other Gases 
 
The radiative forcing from other gases follows the trajectory from the scenario 
Representative Concentration Pathway 3 Peak&Decline (RCP3-PD) from the IMAGE 
model (van Vuuren et al., 2011). This scenario is representative for the scenarios leading 
to extremely low greenhouse gas concentration levels in the literature. It represents a 
substantial reduction of greenhouse gases over time and is a best-case scenario with 
respect to non-carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.  
 
Carbon Cycle Model and Climate Model 
 
The carbon cycle is a three-box model, after Nordhaus and Boyer (2010). The model is a 
linear three-reservoir model (atmosphere, biosphere + ocean mixed layer, and deep 
ocean). Each reservoir is assumed to be homogenous (well-mixed in the short run) and is 
characterised by a residence time inside the box and corresponding mixing rates with the 
two other reservoirs (longer timescales). Carbon flows between reservoirs depend on 
constant transfer coefficients. GHGs emissions (CO2 solely) accumulate in the 
atmosphere and they are slowly removed by biospheric and oceanic sinks. 
 
The stocks of carbon (in the form of CO2) in the atmosphere, in the biomass and upper 
ocean, and in the deep ocean are, respectively, A, B, and O. The variable E is the CO2 




















































The initial values of A, B, and O, and the parameters a12, a21, a23, and a32 determine the 
fluxes between reservoirs. The main criticism which may be addressed to this C-cycle 
model is that the transfer coefficients are constant. In particular, they do not depend on the 
carbon content of the reservoir (e.g. deforestation hindering biospheric sinks) nor are they 
influenced by ongoing climatic change (e.g. positive feedbacks between climate change 
and carbon cycle). 
 
Nordhaus original calibration has been adapted to reproduce data until 2010 and results 
from IMAGE model for a given trajectory of CO2 emissions (see below), giving the 
following results (for a yearly time step): a12= 0.02793, a21=0.03427, a23=0.007863, 
a32=0.0003552, with the initial conditions: A2010=830 GtC (i.e. 391ppm), B2010=845 
GtC and O2010=19254 GtC.  
 
Figure A1, panel B, compares the trajectory of total radiative forcing calculated with the 




used for calibration. This emissions trajectory, from Energy Modeling Forum 24 study, is 
between those of RCP 3PD and RCP 4.5 from RCP database. Panels A and C compares 
the three-box carbon cycle model and IMAGE model results for the RCP 3PD and the 
RCP 4.5 emissions trajectories, respectively. The differences are linked to elements 
modifying transfer coefficients, such as reforestation or deforestation for instance, not 
accounted for in the three-box model with constant transfer coefficients. For information 
the three emissions trajectories A, B and C lead to a temperature increase in 2100, using 
the simplified carbon-cycle and climate model presented here, of 1.9°C, 2.4°C and 2.9°C, 
respectively. 
 
Figure A1. Trajectories of total radiative forcing calculated with the three-box 
carbon cycle model (dashed black lines) and IMAGE model (solid grey line) for three 
given emissions trajectories: (A) the RCP 3-PD emissions trajectory, (B) the 
emissions trajectory used for calibration, from EMF24 study, between those of RCP 





































































⎝⎠ =+  
where API is the pre-industrial CO2 concentration (280 ppm), F2x is the additional radiative 
forcing for a doubling of the CO2 concentration (3.71 W.m
-2), and 
2 non CO F −  is the 





The temperature model is a two-box model, after Schneider and Thompson (1981) and 
Ambrosi et al. (2003), with the atmosphere temperature TA and the ocean temperature TO 































where  T2x is the equilibrium temperature increase at the doubling of the CO2 
concentration, that is, it represents climate sensitivity. All parameters have been calibrated 
to reproduce observed values and IPSL Global Climate Model scenarios for the 21
st 
century (see Ambrosi et al. (2003) for details on calibration), leading to the following 
parameter values (for a yearly time step): σ1=0.1396048 C.W
-1.m
2,  σ2=0.6833236 C
-
1.W.m
-2 and σ3=0.0206022. The climate sensitivity parameter is taken as equal to 3°C, the 
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